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The Political Role of Official Statistics in the former 
GDR (East Germany) 
Peter von der Lippe∗ 
Abstract: This is a report of the results of the author’s more 
detailed study for the German Parliament, in which un-
known documents of only recently opened archives where 
presented. They show that the CSO was fully under the 
command of the party and thus misused as an instrument of 
propaganda to an extend, that was hitherto hardly 
imaginable. It could be shown, that even data on the GDR 
foreign trade with capitalist countries, reported to interna-
tional organisations were deliberately “corrected” by the po-
litical leaders and therefore not trustworthy. 
1. Official Statistics of the former GDR as a subject for 
investigation 
a) Object and methodology 
Academic publications on the official statistics of the former (East) "German 
Democratic Republic« (GDR), the so-called ‘Central Administration of Statis-
tics’ (CAS), after German reunification dealt mainly with ‘only’ organisational 
aspects, responsibilities, the internal structure of authorities, the carrying out of 
inquiries, the control of data flows, and so on.1 
I am convinced, however, that this does not explain the political role of offi-
cial statistics. In particular, relations between the CAS and the political leader-
ship of the former East Germany along with the CAS’ self-image should be 
                                                          
∗ Address all communications to Peter M. von der Lippe, Fachbereich Wirtschaftswissen-
schaften, Universität GH Essen, Universitätsstr. 12, D-45117 Essen. E-Mail: 
plippe@vwl.uni-essen.de. 
1 The advantage of this type of approach is that it can hardly be ‘biased’. 
 considered, and conclusions should be drawn regarding the rote of official 
statistics in a democracy.2 
This account is based on documents from archives, in particular the CAS ar-
chive that came into the hands of the federal statistical office, the FSO, after 
German unification.’3 It shows that official statistics in the former East Ger-
many were almost entirely an instrument of the SED (former communist party), 
and that there was no question of their being objective or neutral. The reign of 
the SED even led to the general public both at home and abroad being deliber-
ately deceived and to a false picture of East Germany emerging in the (former) 
Federal Republic an the basis of East Germany’s official statistics (though not 
without the ignominious involvement of the West Germans). 
b) Standards 
It should not be overlooked that the standards used in East and West Germany 
were quite different. When measured against the standards of a planned econ-
omy, East Germany’s statistics were fine. When measured against the standards 
of a `Western democracy’, however, as they have been repeatedly formulated at 
international level,4 they were a glaringly negative model for official statistics. 
The most noteworthy difference between both forms of standards is that, ac-
cording to ‘Western’ (democratic) thinking 
 
- the information given by respondents (micro data) is subject to secrecy 
(confidentiality) and may leave its mark an aggregate data (macro data) 
in unidentifiable form only whereas, by contrast, 
                                                          
2 This paper is mainly based on my own essay ‘Die Politische Rolle der amtlichen Statistik in 
der ehemaligen DDR’ in: Jahrbücher für Nationalökonomie und Statistik vol. 2156 (1996). 
p. 641 ff. 
3 von der Lippe, Peter. Die gesamtwirtschaftlichen Leistungen der DDR- Wirtschaft in den 
offiziellen Darstellungen, Die amtliche Statistik der DDR als Instrument der Agitation und 
Propaganda der SED, a report commissioned by the German Parliament’s commission of 
inquiry. German Bundestag (ed.). Source Material of the Commission of Inquiry Aufarbei-
tung von Geschichte und Folgen der SED-Diktatur in Deutschland. volume II, part 3, Ba-
den-Baden (Nomos) 1995. p. 1973 - 2193 (hereinafter known as: v.d.Lippe. Materialien) 
also available in paperback edition, Frankfurt/M. (Suhrkamp) 1995. I have actually only 
seen a minute number of these archives. What this means is that the manipulation of statis-
tics set out in this work can only serve as examples. It may also be assumed, however, that 
the many blatant instances involving the party’s control of statistics can no longer be 
proved and had only been verbally enforced, anyway. It should also be expressly empha-
sised that the object of my investigation was not to make general statements regarding the 
quality of data published by the C AS. 
4 These refer to the code of the principles of professional ethics of the International Statistical 
Institute (ISI), the principles set out in the UN Handbook of Statistical Organisation and the 
principles, following the collapse of East Germany, established by the European Confer-
ence of Statisticians (ECS). 
 
 - statistical findings (macro data) are made available to everyone and are 
considered public property, an ‘informational infrastructure’ that no-
one is excluded from using. 
 
In the former East Germany, as in all socialist countries, both principles 
were completely reversed. In a planed economy, statistics are used to rouse 
the public and to control the implementation of plans. The rights of respon-
dents (companies required to report), general information on the public 
with aggregate data and international cooperation were of little interest, or 
were matters exclusively decided upon by the party leadership. Criteria 
were completeness (instead of samples), verification of micro data, speedy 
reporting and efficient processing of data. With these quality standards, 
official statistics were first and foremost an extended arm of state authori-
ties, and less like a neutral body or one providing a service for the general 
public. 
One consequence of ‘democratic centralisation’ or, put more simply, dicta-
torship, is that responsibility for the improper use of statistics is ultimately 
difficult to establish, since almost anyone can refer to an ‘order from above’. 
For us it is of more importance, however, to study the admittedly extreme 
experiences in the former East Germany in order to rethink our ways and make 
us aware of the positive critical role of statistics in a democracy. 
2. Political instruments of Power and official statistics in 
the former GDR 
We will firstly describe the working conditions of statisticians and the 
instruments used by the party to exert influence on the CAS. Sections 3 and 
4 will deal with the consequences that arose from intensifying conflicts 
with other political interests in the GDR (cf. Diagram 1). 
a) Basis: ideological self-image and the Cold War 
The ideological self-image and partiality of official statistics was a disciplinary 
factor that should not be underestimated. Prof. Donda for many years (from the 
early 1960s until 1989) leader of the CAS wrote to Günter Mittag (hereinafter 
known as G.M.),5 after the latter bad criticised the public relations work of the 
CAS, that they had come to the opinion that it was necessary ‘to make better 
                                                          
5 Dr. Günter Mittag was a member of the Central Committee of the SED from 1963 to 1989 
and the Politbüro from 1966 to 1989. He was the Central Committee secretary for econom-
ics from 1963 to 1973 and from 1976 to 1989 and was generally regarded as the most influ-
ential official in all economic issues. 
 use of statistics as a weapon for rousing the public and propaganda to inform 
and rally Party organisations and all workers when implementing these plans’.6 
Objectivity and neutrality were not only discarded but frowned upon as relics 
of a false bourgeois consciousness. It should be made clear that the CAS con-
tinually saw itself as an instrument of the party during the Cold War.  
On the rare occasions when there was contact between East and West, which 
was scrupulously observed by the Party, fit was invariably clear to the East that 
they were dealing with the ‘class enemy’,7 while their interlocutors from the 
West were usually seen as politically candid, unassuming and almost naïve. 
 
b) Integration in the power set-up of the party: inspectors under inspection 
The CAS was officially an organ of the East German council of ministers. In 
actual fact, fit was spoon-fed down to the finest detail by Günter Mittag, the 
leading member of the Politbüro on economic affairs and Secretary of the Cen-
tral Committee of the SED. The CAS received instructions from the Central 
Committee on an almost daily basis regarding studies and queries on reports in 
the Western press, for example, or on speeches by top officials, and so on. It is 
interesting to see how reports commissioned by the CAS were in return ap-
praised and criticised by the Central Committee or, more specifically, in Dr. 
Mittag’s office itself. It was not uncommon for them to be methodically criti-
                                                          
6 Letter from Donda to Mittag of 25 September 1967. 
7 For East Germany, dealing with statistics always had a similar quality to the work of the 
intelligence services. 
 cised and referred back with instructions for resubmission. In all this collusion, 
the CAS gave more the impression of being a private research institute for 
G.M. than for a government office. Exclusive information was frequently given 
to G.M. (without including other top officials). 
Another important instrument was the personnel policy and the control or 
political patronage in the office’s decision-making regarding all external con-
tacts8 (the media, foreign countries, etc.), Even during domestic appearances by 
statisticians, e.g. before the press, the party continually suspected them of being 
immature, incompetent or even politically unreliable and treated them accord-
ingly. Statisticians were required to comment on their figures in a ‘construc-
tive’ and ‘forward-orientated’ (literally vorwärtsweisend) manner, as the con-
temporary ‘technical term’ put it, even when that was not what the figures 
suggested.9 
Their documents were drawn up word for word by the Central Committee 
with a predetermined picture to be given with words and figures, which had to 
tally with the assessments that the Secretariat of the Central Committee had 
already submitted. Where there was divergence between the CAS and such 
figures, it was the statistics that had to be adjusted to those of the party, and not 
the other way round. 
The creation of secondary and controlling devices was also an instrument of 
power. Not only the party, but also the ministries carried out separate inquiries, 
against which they could, to a certain extent, check the data of the CAS. 
c) Monopoly on information, distributors, secrecy and two variants 
The SED managed to control the public dissemination of statistical data com-
pletely at its own discretion. The instrument it used was the so-called ‘distribu-
tor’,10 who made it possible to transmit specific statistical information either 
fully or partly, dressed up or not, to the authorities required, or to deprive them 
of such information. In the West it has not been uncommon 
- to consider the cover-up or dressing-up of statistics as less critical than 
the falsification of statistics and 
- to knowingly think of secretiveness of the little that may have been 
published, but that the little in the way of data that was published was 
                                                          
8 Two cases of dismissal of branch managers were to be found in the files of the CAS, one 
after 15 and the other 25 years of service in official statistics in East Germany, and both 
owing to contact with the West. These dismissals were for reasons such as staying in touch 
by post with a sister-in-law who had fled the Democratic Republic. On top of this, pleas for 
dismissal on personal grounds were rejected, and the reason for the dismissal was left as 
unsuitability with the corresponding consequences as far as pension provisions were con-
cerned. 
9 For some examples of such ‘forward-orientated’ wording, cf. section 3d, Table 1. 
10 He laid down in detail who should obtain what statistical information (tables and analyses). 
 correct within the framework of the underlying definitions and meth-
ods. 
It turned out that both were completely flawed and as we now know, the party11 
at least was in possession of and used figures other than those that were pub-
lished. It can be shown that it was not uncommon not only for the public but 
also for state bodies to learn about only ‘half-truths’, if not misinformation.12 
The general political climate also gave rise to a great readiness among the 
people to consider statistics in general as a state secret and the party’s control 
over the distributor became increasingly rigid over the years. 
d) Party control of definitions and methods, limits of power 
The party’s spectacular intrusion in statistics naturally included the laying 
down of statistical methods and findings. After reunification it became known 
that there were regulations regarding how particular findings of inquiries were 
to be defined so that the corresponding counts would lead to the big or small 
figures required by the party. The best known instances of this include the 
wide-ranging terms for ‘prefabricated buildings’,13, ‘industrial robots’, ‘micro-
processor techniques’ or ‘CAD/CAM systems’ as well as considerable inter-
vention in the measurement of productivity after the formation of combines in 
the late-1960s. The circumstances should be pointed out where 
 
1) such intervention by the party seems to have gone back further than 
was previously assumed. 
2) the extent of overestimates of East Germany made in this way were ac-
tually considerably higher than previously suspected in the West. For 
example, in 1982, the number of ‘industrial robots’ according to the 
common international definition as against East Germany’s was 1:17. 
In other words, the misinformation established quite consciously in this 
manner was considerable. 
 
It was no coincidence that the party intervened in indicators of the social situa-
tion of the population (house-building) and the international standing of East 
Germany as a modern industrialised country. The more East Germany strove 
for its reputation and the more discernible it became that its great technological 
leap forward had not succeeded, the greater the dilemma it found itself in (cf. 
section 4): 
                                                          
11 This does not apply in every case to the state leadership. 
12 Different variants were submitted for the more explosive reports (for internal purposes and 
for public relations work), which allowed varying degrees of insight into the matter. 
13 Another well known instance is the celebration in October 1988 of the opening of the three 
millionth prefabricated building since 1971, when it was actually only the 1.9 millionth. 
 - on the one hand, it wished to be described in the statistics of interna-
tional organisations ‘as a developed socialist industrialised state’, 
- on the other, it also wanted to play it close to its chest. 
 
The ‘provision of figures’ was increasingly a thorn in the side of the politi-
cal leadership. It is also interesting to note that East Germany became inc-
reasingly isolated within COMECON regarding such matters as the defini-
tion of ‘industrial robots’ and it must have felt especially let down by the 
Soviet Union. 
3. The result: confusion, manipulation and falsification 
a) Overview 
In this section it will be shown how, following party instructions and proposals 
made by statisticians, the capitalist ‘class enemy’ was consciously deceived 
with confusing terms and methodical tricks. This went as far as ‘revising’ fig-
ures that had been correctly determined for publication upwards or downwards 
by certain figures, so that we can rightly speak of ‘falsification’. It is also inter-
esting to note the blatant efforts were made to hush this up. 
There was at least one case of genuine falsification,14 which was the provi-
sion of foreign trade data to international organisations. This involved routine 
proposals an those figures relating to East Germany’s foreign trade, in particu-
lar with the NSW,15 COMECON16 and the UN, that were to be submitted. 
These proposals had to be submitted to the Central Committee of the SED for 
approval and to he agreed upon which a number of top politicians. 
Falsification is of course a particularly blatant offence in statistics, but a 
number of basic and less serious practices that at first sight may seem rather 
‘harmless’ (an assessment I do not share) should also be dealt with. 
Finally, it is also interesting to note that the political harnessing of statistics 
can also lead to misjudgements and embarrassing self-deceit, regardless of the 
fact that such a system, even without outside pressure, due to the enormous 
cost of control alone, cannot survive an a permanent basis. 
                                                          
14 Another case appears to have been the report on environmental pollution in East Germany, 
where, according to H.F. Buck, an instructions from the board of the council of ministers 
‘falsified data on sulphur dioxide emissions’ were published and continually ‘admitted only 
as much as the West believed to be true’ (in a commission of inquiry paper in a hearing of 5 
February 1993, cf. Materialien, Volume II/1) 
15 Non socialist economic territory. 
16 Council for mutual economic assistance. 
 b) Creating confusion 
East Germany managed to use certain terms in order to create deliberate mis-
understandings and ambiguities among foreign users of their statistics. The two 
best known examples of this are: 
 
 
- The term Non socialist economic territory (NSW), which was often 
misunderstood as ‘capitalist industrialised country’ (excluding develop-
ing countries) or hard currency countries. 
- The so-called ‘Exchange mark’ (Valutamark - VM)17 continually 
caused Western observers great difficulty, since its equivalent value in 
‘East German Marks’ or in a hard currency was usually unknown; the 
conversion factor would fluctuate and was kept secret. 
 
The exploitation of ‘intentional’ ambiguities and predictable misinterpretations 
in the West in this field18 was rather skilful and clever and achieved its desired 
effect. 
c) Selective publication 
Evidence could be provided of the prohibition of publishing of the following: 
data an emigration, journeys abroad and suicides, along with the quantitative 
expansion of the high-school leaving certificate, or Abitur grade, in secondary 
schools at the behest of Margot Honecker. Following instructions from Mittag, 
from 1975, imports and exports were no longer separated in figures on foreign 
trade, but only the total foreign trade balance (imports plus exports) was dis-
closed. This meant that it was impossible to recognise the balance of trade, as 
                                                          
17 The VM will be discussed in greater detail in part f) of this section. 
18 I have only ever described statistical practices in East Germany where 1 could support them 
with documentary evidence and inspection of files his only ever been very fragmentary. 
Foreign trade is probably only one example of cover-up. Confusion his been documented in 
literature in many other areas. For example, misleading price statistics or budgetary figures 
seem to have been given. 
 the professed aim was to conceal it. Another taboo area was employment in the 
so-called x-field, i.e. the People’s Army, the police, uranium ore-mining, arms’ 
factories, national security service, etc.  
d) Manipulation of words and numbers 
A number of probably very widespread practices used by East German statisti-
cians in their public actions will be taken up briefly below. Though not as spec-
tacular as falsifications, for example, more often than not they managed to 
fulfil their political aim. 
1. ‘Forward-orientated’ texts in ‘public relation work’ 
As already mentioned, written commentary on statistics was very important for 
the SED. It meant that they could have the last word, and the appropriate CAS 
proposals were continually checked in detail by the Central Committee. Nowa-
days, the relevant examples (cf. Table 1) will seem somewhat amusing but 
considerations such as 
- publish or not publish? 
- report absolute figures or only rates of increase? 
- provide commentary or not? If so, how should it be worded? 
at the time played a very important role. Such manoeuvres may seem harmless, 
but on closer inspection, they are not. The overriding aim of statistics is to paint 
an accurate picture of the overall situation. This is done in various ways. Fig-
ures are only one means of achieving this aim, albeit the typical means of sta-
tistics in a narrow sense. The textual commentary of methods and findings is 
also part of it, however.19 
2. Explanations intentionally omitted 
 
                                                          
19 It is probably even more decisive for forming an opinion, since most people find it easier to 
take in texts than bare figures. For this reason, one-sided textual commentaries are also a 
form of manipulation of statistics that should be taken seriously. 
 One example of a shady practice is when methods and terms are deliberately 
left unexplained in tables for public relations work.20 
3. Choosing the base year 
By choosing an inappropriate base year for indices one can be sure of achiev-
ing certain effects. Evidence shows that this has been done deliberately several 
times. 
4. Altering the choice of goods 
The following is a very popular method of data manipulation without changing 
the figures, in other words without direct ‘falsification’: 
- in CAS draft reports of output figures for G.M. only those goods were 
listed where output had risen in terms of volume.21 
- a similar practice in the area of price statistics involved routinely 
changing the choice of goods in absolute published prices, so that only 
those goods appeared in the list where the price had dropped or at least 
remained the same. 
This last tactic is comprehensible even to outsiders by comparing the East 
German statistics yearbooks (StJB). For example, the 1988 StJB, unlike the 
1987 one, no longer contained the following goods, whose price had apparently 
risen: Men’s casual suits, cardigans, pullovers, dress shirts, small typewriters, 
stereo-audio systems. 
Instead, the 1988 StJB included the following new goods:22 Men’s short 
socks, adults’ track suits, plastic bins, matches. 
It should be mentioned in passing that perhaps few advocates of ‘chain indi-
ces’ are aware of the fact that, even with such a seemingly advantageous 
method, the choice of goods and the remaining bases of price surveys (for 
example, the choice of businesses responding) could be changed at will. Obvi-
ously, this does not occur in order to ‘fudge’ price increases, but in the interest 
of the particular current basket of goods. Unfortunately, only very few people 
realise that this can damage comparability or even pave the wav for manipula-
tion.23 
                                                          
20 The point here was that a table, unlike before, did not include data on a certain combine, 
because the combine had apparently given the wrong information. This had been indicated 
in tables for internal use, but not in the published version. 
21 In one document, the reference ‘not published owing to a fall in output’ is even explicitly 
quoted. 
22 Not listed in the 1987 StJB. 
23 It is also highly peculiar that. at Eurostat, the greatest efforts are male purely in the interests 
of price comparisons to attain countries’ lists of goods in international comparisons and not 
only that there is seen to be nothing dubious about the formation of chain indices with con-
tinually changing goods baskets, but that this is seen as progress. 
 5. Base-adjusting 
 
If a growth rate should be higher than it actually is over the previous year’s, 
obviously it is arithmetically possible to simply reduce the previous year’s 
figures. In East Germany, this was known as ‘base-adjusting’ (literally Basis-
bereinigung). The term can also be found in the files, together with formula-
tions such as de following: 
- to ‘ensure the scheduled growth rate’, 
- the ‘scheduled’ base-adjusting is no longer possible, as de previous 
month’s figures are already in Geneva, and 
- the provision of figures could be delayed for one or more months and 
‘the adjustment between the monthly indices that is appropriate’ where 
a drop is only temporary could then be checked. 
e) Falsification of figures for international organisations 
We shall confine ourselves to the description of one case of falsification. ‘In 
the interest of showing an export surplus’, a number of changes were made to 
the half-yearly results (first half-year of 1987: exports +2.2 billion VM24 and 
imports +1.1 billion VM), which overall turned an import surplus of 250 mil-
lion VM into an export surplus of 850 million VM. Accordingly ‘revisions’ of 
the same amount were proposed for the first three quarters, which would have 
transformed an import surplus to the value of 579 million VM into an export 
surplus of 521 million VM. 
As such this not too dramatic, as there was a whole series of such occur-
rences that led to the UN and COMECON being informed. What makes this 
case interesting, however, is the fact that G.M. apparently intervened because 
he would not accept a balance of +521 million VM, demanding one of +910 
million instead. 
This balance would then be disclosed and submitted to international organi-
sations. Furthermore, it is quite amusing to see how easily the required balance 
of + 910 million VM was ‘produced’ by the CAS: in the original draft imports 
were simply reduced from 18428 to 17893. The reason for this so called ‘cen-
tral recommendation’ of G.M. (in fact rather a ‘central instruction’) seems to 
have been to reveal: 
1) an increase in exports in the NSW 
                                                          
24 For the exchange mark as a unit of currency in East German foreign trade, roughly the 
following conversion rate applied: 2.776 VM = 1 US $. The abovementioned ‘revision’ 
therefore amounted to a balance of + 306 million $, instead of - 90 million $, which was not 
insignificant, as with this revision, East Germany’s exports to the West increased by about 
20% over this period. 
 2) a foreign trade surplus over de WO and also 
3) an increasing export surplus over the course of the year. 
 
The consideration of all these restrictions is a very interesting problem mathe-
matically speaking. Objective No. 3 led to the following restriction: if the bal-
ance had been +521 and not +910, the West could think that East Germany had 
ended the third quarter of 1987 with a balance of - 329 = (521 - 850); in other 
words, the balance would have to be greater than 850, which is the (false) value 
officially reported for the First two quarters, at least.25 
It could be perfectly well imagined that these ‘revisions’ were not malicious 
falsifications, since the CAS may not have been informed of all East German 
foreign trade with the West as, for example, they had no data an the military 
sector or only obtained certain data later on. If that were the case, then certain 
statements in the files would sound, at the least, slightly unusual: 
- ‘Judging from the previous years’ experiences, the modest rise possible 
in the actual data is a prerequisite for being able to publish credible 
findings in the future’, or 
- ‘It will be ensured that the revisions to be made ... cannot be checked 
by the organs of COMECON and the UN’, 
- in order to attain ‘a justifiable rise in exports’ or 
- ‘In the interest of providing evidence of an export surplus and in accor-
dance with the development of data to be reported . . .’ 
- ‘No inconsistencies should arise regarding any data published in press 
reports owing to this practice’ and 
- ‘In the proposal ... it was assumed that ... this finding could be under-
stood using data on the exports or imports of partner states. For this rea-
son ... I do not think it is possible to work with an even higher level of 
revision’, or these is talk of 
- a ‘precision’ (instead of revision), which was necessary to guarantee the 
data required on growth and the balance of trade’. 
It turned out later that the state of East German foreign trade in relation to 
Western industrialised countries was precarious as far back as 1986, whereas in 
actual fact, until the fall of East Germany, seemingly great export achievements 
had been reported (and were even believed by the West). 
f) Inadvertent consequences, some rather more subtle aspects 
1) The absence of a critical public: Statistical offices in the West are usu-
ally not only obliged by law to plan and conduct their inquiries while 
being careful that the methods they use are appropriate, but also to try 
                                                          
25 The question of why G.M. arranged for the ‘recommended’ 910, and not, for example, 890 
or 960, to be given, remains unanswered. 
 and gain acceptance among respondents. In addition, they must lay 
themselves open to criticism, even regarding their methods. By con-
trast, the CAS was completely free from such obligations. This is a fac-
tor that may, at least subliminally, also be relevant to the events set out 
below. 
2) Self-deceit: It says a lot that the CAS was genuinely convinced that 
East Germany fared a better in international comparisons than was ac-
tually the case. For example, calculations were submitted to the Central 
Committee alleging that East Germany had outstripped the United 
Kingdom in terms of per capita national income (not per worker) and 
Italy in terms of labour productivity and prosperity. Moreover, in 1985, 
the CAS submitted a calculation in an internal paper to the Central 
Committee alleging that labour productivity in East Germany was 
higher than in Japan in 1970, 1975, 1980 and 1983, a country whose la-
bour productivity was  placed at the low level of the former Soviet Un-
ion. Such blatantly false estimates are only really possible after years of 
living behind an impenetrable wall, avoiding all communications with 
critical public for foreign countries, as the Devil avoids holy water. 
3) Deceiving with correct figures: Finally, another aspect that borders on 
statistics should be addressed. To give just one example, it is quite fit-
ting that East Germany, in the late 1980s, should have had more 
economists, researchers, and so on, that the Federal Republic (though 
this is a matter if definition). While this was not untrue, it was a falsifi-
cation, as there is plenty of evidence to suggest that these people were 
not very effective. 
4) Incorrect data as a basis for statistics: There is an ample evidence that 
major errors emerged when collecting data in East Germany since, in a 
command economy, there is a great tendency to create false data. If the 
data are already incorrect when being collected, however, than an au-
thority that collects this data quite correctly and seriously can also cre-
ate a false image and be an instrument of misinformation, even with a 
clear conscience. 
g) Errors and falsification in statistics 
This raises the question of the difference between errors and falsification. The 
deciding factor is the purpose being pursued. Errors are an issue, a very central 
issue, in fact, in statistics, but falsification is not. Errors are usually unavoid-
able, morally harmless and do not bring statistics into question; The same can-
not be said for falsification. 
If you take into account the intention of the aim pursued by this definition, 
you are entering a difficult terrain. A legitimate task of economic statistics can 
be seen, that of gaining ‘selective knowledge’ can be used to support argu-
 ments. If this was dispensed with, statistics would be deprived of a large share 
of their ‘practical’ use. In this regard, statisticians would behave like lawyers. 
A lawyer's job is not to describe the legal position, but to find and present legal 
arguments to support his case. 
In my opinion, the rubicon will be crossed once this view is adopted in offi-
cial statistics.26 Such behaviour is reprehensible, since it ruins the reputation 
and reliability of official statistics. All forms (also milder forms) of shady sta-
tistics to create a false image among the public with the authority of official 
statistics are unacceptable.27 
4. The West and Statistics in East Germany 
The role of the West is double-sided. On the one hand, it was both a user of 
statistics and partly even an interlocutor with statisticians in the East, and it 
seems that it did not especially distinguish itself in this role. On the other hand, 
the West had set up a network for international cooperation that was positively 
shaped by its Spirit of democracy and transparency. It was in this role of pace-
setter for international cooperation that the West made a decisive contribution 
to the collapse of a statistical System such as East Germany’s. 
A fair ‘reconstruction’ of the East German chapter in the history of official 
statistics in Germany in my opinion also requires an examination of the West 
German side. Here, the problem is not so much that from today’s standpoint 
much has revealed itself to be political naivety and misjudgement (one is al-
ways wiser with hindsight). The problem is rather that those responsible have 
so far not (or at least not very noticeably) owned up to their mistakes.28 Imme-
diately after the collapse of East Germany, they even quite openly presented 
                                                          
26 To use the same metaphor, their task should be to describe the legal position 
27 They are often wrongly dismissed as trivial offences. To knowingly use, for example, non-
publication, misleading terms, ambiguous definitions and inadequately explained methods 
and definitions in order to deceive the ‘class enemy’ is not trivial. For these are the simplest 
and least transparent ways to falsify statistics. Unlike blatant instances of falsification, such 
offences require no costly cover-up and there is no need to worry whether the figures are 
consistent with other figures or over the course of time. 
28 This applies in particular to the German Institute for Economic Research (DIW) the studies 
of which decisively shaped the official picture that the former Federal Republic had of the 
East German economy. It is now quite easy to See that an attempt by the DIW to gain an 
unbiased view of East Germany using ‘in-built’ East German statistics, with a high degree 
of understanding of their problems and with a more technocratic outlook was not suitable in 
order to be able to See through the dressed-up self-portrayal of East Germany. It is not 
without irony that the DIW described its ‘line’ as follows: ‘We fundamentally believe that 
the figures officially published by East Germany are reliable.’(according to a document not 
included in this paper). Not only was this line blatantly untrue it could also have been mis-
used by the CAS in its purely political public relations work, which is actually what hap-
pened. 
 accounts of the extraordinary degeneracy of the East German economy, while 
only a few months earlier, they themselves had declared it to be in reasonably 
good health. 
East German involvement in international organisations (which was very 
important to them) gradually became an increasingly significant barrier to the 
power of the SED over statistics. In retrospect and for citizens of a democracy, 
it is hard to comprehend how much the party leadership and official statistics 
took a hammering from requests to provide international organisations with 
statistical data. The price East Germany had to pay for preserving its interna-
tional reputation was very high and only gradually did it become clear. Among 
other things, this involved that the covering and manipulation of statistics was 
becoming increasingly difficult. Another concern were the developments in 
data technology. Reports on hackers, for example, were followed with great 
interest. 
It is no exaggeration to say that the system of official statistics in East Ger-
many described so far was defeated first and foremost from abroad. It deserves 
to be stated that transparency and international cooperation in matters of statis-
tics can also be an instrument of democratisation, an impression that struck me 
the most while working with official statistics of East Germany. 
5. An attempt to draw conclusions 
a) Democratic principles in statistics 
In 1987, a working group of former leading officials of the CAS wrote an ap-
proximately 300 page-long history of the CAS up to 1980,29 achieving the feat 
of reporting an as good as none of the facts addressed here. Only three pages 
are devoted to more technical aspects of CAS publications. This shows clearly 
that there are two worlds in matters of statistics, each with its own quality 
standards. 
As it is with everything in life, it it’s the spirit from which something arises 
that determines the outcome. How statisticians understand their role in a de-
mocracy is therefore very important. Democratic standards are the basis for 
everything (cf. Diagram 3) and they can easily be developed in the light of the 
bad experiences of the counter-model. The example of statistics in East Ger-
many underlines how important it is to consider the core of democratic princi-
ples and to continually ensure that statistics are established democratically. 
 
                                                          
29 An internal unpublished paper of the CAS. 
 b) The democratic constitution of statistics 
What has been reported an in this paper has been less the result of the misbe-
haviour of individual statisticians30 than the consequences of a system con-
cerned with those official statistics that suited its own purposes. There can be 
no good statistician without also having a good (legal and political) constitution 
of statistics. 
It is tempting to lay down those findings that official statistics should pro-
vide and to suppress findings that are not convenient. The negative example of 
East German statistics also shows the dangers of all forms of monopolisation of 
information and all attempts to subordinate statistics to political goals. 
 
 
The only effective protection from these dangers is the independence of sta-
tistical offices and the transparency and international nature of statistical prac-
tices. The negative example of the grip held by G.M. over the CAS should give 
reason to think about giving statistical offices more autonomy. The neutrality 
of official statistics will above all be served by staying out of (political) dis-
putes.31 Independence and neutrality of statistics are strong values that should 
be recognised by all, in particular the political leadership of the state. This 
should be pointed out by official statistics more aggressively in public relation 
work. Experiences with East German statistics Could provide the key to this. 
c) Openness, transparency and competition 
Information and communication are productive forces. These forces only un-
fold, however, when the information is correct and the statistics are open about 
their findings. If statistics, an the other hand, are regarded as contact with state 
                                                          
30 It should not be forgotten that probably only a handful of people were aware of the docu-
ments presented and commented on here. Thousands of people worked for many years in 
the apparatus of the CAS without knowing about what is set out here. 
31 Therefore, it says a great deal for a system where the collection of data is largely a matter 
for official (state) statistics and that competing private institutes are largely entrusted with 
the far more contestable analysis of this data. 
 secrets, then objective scientific curiosity about statistical data, which is neces-
sary if they are to be made at all useful, cannot be developed. Secretiveness in 
East Germany seems to have even been detrimental to the State itself.32 The 
cost of control that had to be sustained was formidable and at the same time 
futile; in the long rum, East Germany’s backwardness and the discontentment 
of its people could not be kept secret. In the end, East German statistics were 
practically a mirror image of the (bankrupt) East German economy. Statistics 
could not be accepted as objective by the representatives of the broadest of 
interests, and therefore could not fulfil its function. 
International cooperation in official statistics, transparency and critical dis-
cussions of methods and findings are to be valued highly. Without them, the 
professional integrity of statisticians and acceptance among respondents and 
users cannot be preserved. It is significant that in East Germany attempts were 
made to prevent these precise things in order to create the form of ‘statistics’ 
that suited the dictatorship. 
There should also be a healthy mix of official statistical bodies and compet-
ing private statistical evaluations. In retrospect, it is a blessing that it was a 
private economic research institute that was responsible in the Federal Republic 
for the downright embarrassing misjudgement of the former East Germany, and 
not official statistics. 
d) Acceptance 
Without the integrity of statistics referred to above, the acceptance and image 
of statistics cannot be improved. Whether or not this succeeds is less a matter 
for the provider of statistics than the user. However, for statisticians it is a 
permanent task and challenge to strive for this. Statisticians are also responsible 
for the efficient use of statistics. Only in this way can acceptance be achieved 
in the long rum, and only in this way can the value of statistics be extended to 
all. 
The experience of East German statistics could perhaps heighten awareness 
that the openness and neutrality of statistics, the use of statistics by everyone 
and an independent statistical authority is just as much an element of democ-
racy as freedom of speech. This should encourage statisticians to be more as-
sertive, to insist on the participation of respondents, to act against the improper 
use of statistics, and also to call for the state to exercise restraint when it comes 
to cutting back on resources. The strive for acceptance and the professional 
integrity of statisticians is a good thing, but it is not enough. It is important to 
                                                          
32 This includes not only the well-known ‘self-deceit’, but also mistrust of the people regard-
ing statistics and the remaining state apparatus and the formidable cost that had to be sus-
tained for the control, secrecy and ‘revisions’. It is important to note that under conditions 
such as these that existed in East Germany statistics could not be both productive and an 
instrument of knowledge. 
 take the offensive and to find allies in politics who will give the statisticians the 
support they need. 
e) Political protection of official statistics 
Preserving democratic principles calls for on-going protection of statistics by 
politicians. It is relatively easy to emotionalise the general public against offi-
cial statistics. It is often enough just to be one of ‘those affected’ to qualify as 
an ‘expert’ an statistics, when these statistics are actually merely burdensome. 
In the former West Germany, an emotionally charged and legally dominated 
discussion occurred relating to the 1983 census in which, in my opinion, a 
number of political aspects of official statistics were all too briefly included 
and in which the main concern involved legislating an statistics and putting it 
in shackles, just as if it were a danger for the free citizen. 
Hardly anyone saw that statistics were not an instrument of an authoritarian 
state but actually an instrument of free citizens. The danger of the improper use 
of personal data was seen, but not the danger of monopolisation and politicisa-
tion of statistics. 
In the current discussion in which other issues come to the fore, for example 
the belief that cutbacks in statistics lead to a leaner and better state it is most 
likely that we again miss the point. Dealing with the official statistics of the 
former East Germany could prove useful in recognising that the real problem is 
not confidentiality, response burden, or cost of statistics but non-neutral, and 
eventually useless official statistics, which clearly is detrimental to everybody, 
also to the State itself. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
